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Psychology
Risk-Sensitivity and Predictors of Choice Preference: Parenting, Addiction, and
Dispositional Variables
Director: Allen Szalda-Petree, Ph.D.
The goal of this study was to assess the sensitivity of males and females to
variation in reward amount under winning and losing conditions. Winning and
losing were analogues to a negative and positive budget within the behavioral
ecology model of the daily energy budget. Participants were asked to choose
between the two choice options, one yielding a fixed reward amount and the
other with a variable reward, while both options yield an equal mean reward for
the duration of the session. During the task, the participant logged on to the
Internet in order to play against an assumed competitor. The five hypotheses for
the study were as follows: 1) Under the winning condition, males and females
would demonstrate risk-aversion and under the losing condition males would
exhibit risk-prone behavior, while females would remain risk-averse, although
less risk-averse than in the positive budget. 2) Participants with children would
demonstrate greater risk-sensitivity than those without children. 3) Females
unconstrained by hormones and ovulating during the time of the task would
demonstrate the greatest risk-aversion. 4) Individuals who report greater
substance use would be more risk-sensitive than non-users. 5) Dimensions from
the NEO-PI R would be predictive of choice preference.
The results support hypothesis one, males did demonstrate risk-sensitive
behavior under both the negative and the positive budget conditions and the
females exhibited risk-averse behavior within the negative budget condition.
There were no statistically significant correlations between choice patterns and
ovulation, substance use, or domain scores on the NEO-PI R.
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1
Introduction
The conditions under which humans take risks have been widely debated.
Perhaps one of the first to formally observe risk-preference outcomes was the
Swiss mathematician Daniel Bernoulli. Bernoulli posited that individuals prefer
one alternative over another in order to maximize the value or utility of the
options available (Lopes, 1984). There are numerous theories and models
targeting choice behavior, all of which address this important question of why a
decision maker selects one choice over another. In the natural environment, it is
adaptive for choosing (foraging) organisms to select the food patch or resource
option that best suits their needs. The selection of the optimal choice will ensure
the forager's survival. Traditionally, the term "foraging" within the ecological
literature refers to the allocation of food by nonhuman animals. However,
foraging research has merged the fields of psychology and ecology and a more
flexible definition has been adopted. The term "foraging" in the context of this
paper will refer to the search, selection, and seizure of any desirable resource by
human or nonhuman animals. The foraging choices under economic
circumstances, mate selection, or within the context of something as seemingly
trivial as finding a place to park one's car is of significance, it may be telling of
more distal explanations of behavior. In all of these examples, one choice against
all alternatives will be of greater value, the selection of that choice is contingent
upon the perceived costs and the weighted benefits of that choice. In other
words, the rewards of each choice are variable and it is that variability of
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outcomes that makes one choice riskier than another. The sensitivity of the
forager to variability will dictate the strategy employed by the individual in
making their choice selection. It is the sensitivity of the choosing organism to
variability in reward options that is of interest in this study. The decision to
select a choice yielding a fixed or variable outcome may provide further insight
into the underlying mechanisms of choice behavior from an evolutionary
perspective. Those models that assume that foraging behavior and choice
preference for a particular patch or food option is the result of evolutionary
pressures and fitness consequences are referred to as functional models. In
contrast, mechanistic models are those that explain foraging behavior and choice
preferences in terms of psychological processes like learning and perception.
This does not mean that these behaviors are not the consequence of evolutionary
adaptation, but mechanistic models do not assume that evolution and fitness
functions assert direct pressure on the foraging behaviors (Bateson & Kacelnik,
1998). All foraging models can be explained in relation to functional and
mechanistic terms.
Animal Models of Choice

Virtually all animal models are functional models. Therefore it is
important to appreciate that when choice behavior is applied to "risk," it means
something different than the more colloquial usage. "Risk" generally refers to a
continuum of danger or peril, in comparative, behavioral biology and
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psychology "risk" is referred to as the unpredictable, variable outcome that may
maximize or minimize the fitness of a particular organism.
Optimal Foraging Theory (OFT). Optimal foraging theory, a functional

model, suggests that foraging strategies show heritable variation, a consequence
of evolutionary pressure and that natural selection will favor those foraging
strategies that offer maximum fitness (Pyke, G. H., Pulliam, H. R., & Charnov, E.
L., 1977). In theory, the forager's choice behavior will always maximize or
minimize resource exploitation, consistent with the risk-reward relationship
between the following factors: currency (energy gain), time (search and
handling) and solving for the option yielding the optimal cost-benefit outcome.
The ideal strategy for a forager is dependent upon the individual needs of that
organism. Schoener (1971) predicted that if an organism has a static amount of
time with which to quarry resources and if the fitness of the forager increases
continually in conjunction with nourishment obtained, then the organism would
be an energy-maximizer. Yet, if an organism requires time to perform other
activities and the fitness of the animal does not increase, such that the amount of
energy useful to the organism is fixed, then the forager is referred to as an energyminimizer. Mellgren, Misasi, and Brown (1984) provided limited evidence to

support the optimal foraging model by manipulating the travel requirements for
food acquisition by two rats utilizing various patches with differing food
densities in each patch (a sandbox). The purpose of this experiment was to
assess how environmental constraints operate to affect the foraging behavior of
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an optimal forager. One of the two subjects demonstrated an increase in the
number of food items harvested from a given patch. The increase in harvested
food items also demonstrated an increase in the amount of time spent utilizing a
given area as travel requirements from patch to patch increased, thus providing
some support for the optimal foraging model.
Marginal Value Theorem. Charnov's marginal value theorem asserts that

while a foraging organism is in a given resource patch, the food or resource
intake for that patch will decrease in relation to the amount of time spent there
(1976). Consistent with optimal foraging theory, the marginal value theorem
asserts that the forager is assumed to make decisions in an effort to maximize the
net rate of energy income during any given foraging episode. Thus, the
important question becomes one of departure or the "giving up time." It is
assumed that the forager will leave when the marginal capture rate of a patch
drops to the average capture rate for that habitat (Charnov, 1976). The formula
can be written as an energy balance equation:
En = E Pi-gi(Ti) - t-Er

t

+

EPi-Ti

Pi is the proportion of the visited patches that are of a given type, Et represents

the energy cost for inter-patch traveling, gi(Ti) is the cost of searching for the
desirable resource (e.g. food), and Ti represents the time spent in a given patch
(Charnov, 1976). The marginal value theorem assesses patch value and provides
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a way to predict the time spent searching within a patch and the time at which a
given forager will depart or give up one patch for another.
Jensen's Inequality. Jensen's inequality provides a mathematical model for

ascertaining a fitness value from a given amount of energetic sustenance.
Typically models of risk-sensitivity rely on Jensen's inequality as an explanatory
means of how risk affects foraging decisions (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1998). Risky
foraging options are those that yield two or more possible resource values. How
these resource values affect fitness can be ascertained through the following
function: y =f(x), where y represents fitness and x represents the units food
obtained from a foraging option. When applied to risk-sensitive foraging
theory, one of the two foraging alternatives must be variable; this makes the
foraging decision non-linear. If the relationship between the fitness value and
the foraging decision is linear, then it would not be a risky decision since both
options offer equal fitness.
The fitness value of a foraging option can be derived by averaging the
income of a variable option (E{xJ) prior to the application of the fitness function,
written as E{y} = f(E{x}). In addition, the average value of a foraging option can
also be evaluated after applying the amount of value gleaned from the food
attained, so that E{y} = E{f(x)}; however/(E{xJ) =f=E(/{x}), therein lies the crux of
Jensen's inequality (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1998; Kirshenbaum, 2000). If fitness and
food amounts are nonlinear and if averaging the outcomes from the variable
options with the fitness values occurred following the application of the function
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y =f(x), then risk-sensitivity is predicted (Bateson & Kacenik, 1998). If the

function of y =f(x) is increasing and decelerating, then choice preference should
demonstrate risk aversion. However, if y =f(x) is decreasing and accelerating,
then risk-prone behavior is predicted. Since optimal foraging theory models
convert the average long term rates of gain by averaging outcomes before y -f(x )
has been applied, OFT does not predict risk-sensitivity. (Bateson & Kacelnik,
1998).
Risk-Sensitive Foraging Theory. Risk-sensitive foraging theory (RSF),

encompasses a number of other functional models, most of which are based on
the following choice paradigm: an organism has two or more foraging options
(or patches) that yield the same average amount of nourishment, but the
variability of obtainable food differs from option to option (e.g. Batson and
Kacelnik, 1995). If the forager always favors the constant or fixed option, its
preference is referred to as risk-averse, but if the preference is for the option with
greater variability, this behavior has been labeled risk-prone. Consistent with the
model of optimal foraging theory, risk-sensitive foraging theory also assumes
that animals will behave in ways that maximize their inclusive fitness. According
to Smallwood (1996), the key contribution of risk-sensitive foraging theory is the
sensitivity of organisms to variability in the reward rate and the preference of
one foraging option over another in relation to the energetic gain and loss by the
organism. In addition, the variability with respect to the amount or to the time to
reward delivery is variable about the mean.
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Whether the forager is in a positive or a negative energy slope will be predictive
of risk strategy, averse or prone. The negative or positive energetic slope is the
organism's daily energy budget.
Daily Energy Budget, In a natural stochastic environment, food availability

is variable, as is the interval of time between the search and the utilization of a
given resource. The foraging choices of an organism may reflect where the
animal falls on its energetic continuum. This continuum, one's positive or
negative energy store is referred to as the daily energy budget. The selection of
a more variable option reveals a higher rate of energy production (caloric) than
consumption by the organism, whereas the selection of a less variable option
demonstrates the opposite. When the average energy intake from either the
variable or fixed option exceeds the needs of the animal, the energy budget rule
predicts that the animal will prefer the less variable option (Smallwood, &
Carter, 1966). The daily energy budget is one of the most tested predictions
within foraging research with a subject base that has a representation of virtually
all classes, examples include nectarivorous birds (e.g. Carter & Dill, 1990; Carter,
1991; Pimm, 1978; Wunderle, J. M., Santa Castro, S., & Fetcher, N., 1987),
nectarivorous insects (e.g. Real, 1980; Real, L., O tt,}., and Shvereine, E., 1982;
Waddington, K. D. 1995;) gravinous birds (e.g. Bateson & Kacelnik, 1997; Caraco,
1980,1981,1983,1990; Case, D. A.; Nichols, P., & Fantino, E., 1995; Hamm &
Shettleworth, 1987; Tuttle, E. F., Wulfson, L., & Caraco, T. 1990), migratory birds
(e.g. Moore & Simm, 1986), cichlid fish (e.g. Roche, Dravet, Bolyard, & Rowland,
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1998; Young, Clayton, & Barnard, 1990), adult humans (e.g. Pietras &
Hackenberg, 2001), and rodents (e.g. Barnard & Brown, 1985; Kirshenbaum et al.,
2000). Caraco et al. (1980) tested the hypothesized relationship between expected
daily energy budgets and sensitivity to the mean and variance of resource
amount using yellow-eyed juncos and dark-eyed juncos (1981) and found that
risk-preferences could be predicted as a result of whether the birds had obtained
sufficient daily nourishment.

The juncos adapted their foraging strategies

under different conditions. They exhibited risk-averse behavior when they
succeeded in accommodating their energy requirement, but modified that
behavior in a more risk-prone manner when they were behind in fulfilling their
daily energy requirement.
Molar Maximization Theory. One model of the daily energy budget, molar

maximization theory, predicts that an organism will maximize the probability of
obtaining enough food to meet the energetic costs within the specific foraging
constraints. Therefore, the preference for one option over another reflects a
forager's maximum resource requirements per unit time. A mathematical model
of molar maximization, or the z-score model, proposed by Stephens and Charnov
(1982) posits that risk-sensitivity may be conceptualized in terms of starvation
due to energetic deficits. For organisms with exceptionally high metabolic needs,
operating at an energy shortage could lead to starvation. If the choice options
lead to starvation or survival, risk-sensitive foragers reduce the probability of
starvation, such that z represents the foraging constant or the predictive behavior
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of risk-averse or risk-prone strategy use. The formula can be interpreted as
follows:
z = (R-u)/s
where u is the mean food reward, s is the standard deviation of food reward,
and R is the forager's energetic requirement. The utility of this model is in the
predictive value of measuring a forager's behavior. Manipulations of variability
in reward quantity and delay to reward have demonstrated differences in riskpreference. Under conditions of varying delay, foragers are risk-prone.
Conversely, when the variability is in reward amount, foraging behavior is riskaverse. This illustrates the importance of timing as an element in risk-sensitivity
as well as reward magnitude (Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996; Reboreda and
Kacelnik, 1991). When food contributes linearly to reproductive success, an
animal foraging over an extended period of time should maximize its mean net
rate of energetic gain (McNamara, 1996).
Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET). Unlike the fore-mentioned models, scalar

expectancy theory is a mechanistic model. SET asserts that risk-sensitivity is the
result of perceptual processes and associative learning. Although reward
amount is important, time is also of value when interpreting one's foraging
decisions. The weighting of the various foraging options will differ based on the
differential time between search and food acquisition, and the handling time of
the food in relation to the ingestion of the prey or food item. The intervals
between meals are often referred to as the inter-capture interval, where "capture"
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refers to the ingestion of the food. Weber's Law asserts that the just noticeable
(minimum) difference in prey density (prey patches as analogues to stimuli)
required to see two prey patches as different is proportional to the mean value of
the two prey patch options. If a forager expects no variability in prey density it
will register a value within the range of the true density value plus or minus one
just noticeable difference, thereby constructing a distribution of subjective
variability based on the individual forager's perceptions of prey density.
Weber's Law presents a cognitive component, which is memory, the memory of
previous prey density in relation to what is currently experienced (Kacelnick &
Bateson, 1996).
A modified version of Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET), a continuation of
Weber's Law applied to foraging theory, suggests that a stimulus followed by a
variable delay to food or a desired resource will be remembered as the
combination of the delays in relation to the amount of food yielded after each
time interval. It is expected then that foragers will choose between two options
based on a memory representation for each delay or amount. When a
conditioned stimulus (CS) is presented to a subject, it creates a memory trace that
decays with time until the presentation of the unconditioned stimulus (US).
Following a reinforced trial, a value is attributed to the CS-US pair and the
memory trace of the CS decays in a hyperbolic manner. The hyperbolic decay
suggests that when mean delays are equivalent, a CS followed by a variable
delay to the onset of the US will be more valued than a fixed CS-US delay pair
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(Kirshenbaum, 2000). SET predicts that variability in delay will be preferred to a
constant delay to reinforcement and that a fixed reward amount will be preferred
to variable reinforcement (Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996). In other words, risk-prone
behavior should be expected when delay is manipulated and risk-averse
behavior when amount is manipulated.
A problem with the SET model is that it is difficult to predict using an
energy budget manipulation because the delay to reward in energy budget
manipulations are based on the forager's success in allocating resources, which
are typically always variable. In addition, the daily energy budget model is
based on the variability of reward, which according to SET should be predictive
of risk-aversion. But the delays are generally also variable, which predicts riskprone behavior, so applying SET in daily energy budget manipulations can be
problematic. These delay constraints are of central importance in self-control
studies as well; the self-control manipulations are also based on the idea of
variable and fixed delays in relation to reward amount.
Self Control Studies

A self-controlled decision is generally defined as the choice of a larger,
more delayed reinforcer over a smaller, less delayed reinforcer. Conversely, an
impulsive decision is the choice of a smaller; less delayed reinforcer over the
larger more delayed option. In self-control research, molar maximization theory
poorly predicts performance and although self-control studies are not analogous
to risk-sensitivity, they do apply the same principles of choice, the selection of
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one option yielding greater energetic gain than another. Self-control research is
relevant to work in risk-sensitivity because similar mechanisms are addressed.
For example, one might expect those species that demonstrate a greater degree of
self-control to also conform more to the daily energy budget model of risksensitivity. Those species that exhibit self-control would be expected to be riskaverse under all conditions, except those that reflect an extremely negative
energy budget where not risking would ensure death or extreme loss of energy.
A number of studies have addressed the self-control behavior of rats
(Tobin, Chelonis & Logue, 1993; Van Haaren, Van Hest, & Van De Poll, 1988)
primates (Anderson, Awazu, & Fujita, 2000; Tobin, Logue, Chelonis &
Ackerman, 1996), pigeons (Logue, Pena-Correal, Mauro, 1984; 1985; Mazur &
Logue, 1978), and humans both in adults (Forzano & Logue, 1992; Kirk & Logue,
1996; Logue & Pena-Correal, Rodriguez, & Kabela, 1986; Logue & King, 1991)
and children (Logue & Chavarro, 1992; Miller & Weinstein, 1978). Pigeons and
rats generally select the impulsive option within a self-control paradigm. While
primates, both human and nonhuman are considered self-controlled in decision
making situations, female hominids typically choose self-controlled options
slightly more than males (Logue & Chavarro, 1992). Historically self-control
research has focused on the delay to reinforcement and the quantitative amount
of reward offered as the most critical components of behavior, while response
effort has been more conservatively addressed. The fundamental assumption
underlying the inclusion of an effort manipulation is that by increasing response

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

effort, self-control will also increase. Theoretically, self-control should increase
with the addition of an effort requirement because the greater response effort
taxes the individual of their energy surplus. The self-controlled option would
then promote energy conservation and maximization of reward or
reinforcement. Chelonis, Logue, Sheehy, & Mao (1998) have demonstrated that
rats typically increase self-controlled choices as response effort increases within
0.8 N of force, as does the response latency. In contrast, Velkey (1995) applied an
effort manipulation to an experiment using running wheels as the choice
manipulanda with two different treatment conditions. The first treatment
allowed for the concurrent operation of two different variable interval schedules.
In this experiment the rats failed to achieve self-control. In the second treatment,
the choices in the higher effort conditions were not significantly less impulsive
than those from the low effort condition, but were not self-controlled responses.
Social-Cognitive Models of Choice

Analogous models of foraging theory and risk behavior can be found in
economics, social psychology and sociology. These models are not defined in
terms of functional etiology as are the comparative models. Instead these models
assert that choice is the result of social and or cognitive factors, therefore these
models are all mechanistic. Economic models of risk, uncertainty and decision
making generally stem from the expected utility theory proposed by Von
Neum ann and Morgenstern (1964).
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Expected utility theory is based on a set of axioms, which offer criteria for
the rationality of choice. The utility of a risky prospect is equal to the expected
utility of its weighted probability outcomes, such that a rational decision-maker
will prefer the prospect in a decision that yields the highest expected utility,
provided that the decision-maker is rational and consistent in their selections
(Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D., 1981; Von Neumann, J. & Morgenstern, O., 1964).
Prospect Theory. Prospect theory is essentially a modification of the

expected utility theory, however noting the violations of its assumptions like the
certainty effect or those choice preferences (e.g. transivity of preferences) that do not

necessarily yield the highest expected utility. An example of such a violation is
provided by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), given the option of selecting Choice
A, which provides a 50% chance of winning a three week tour of England, France
and Italy and selecting Choice B, which affords a one-week tour of England with
certainty, 78% of a 72-person sample selected the more probable choice. Yet
when the probabilities were further narrowed, the transitivity o f preferences axiom
of the expected utility theory was violated, using the same sample and same
choices but with narrower probabilities such that selecting Choice A, provided a
5% chance of winning a three week tour of England, France and Italy and
selecting Choice B, afforded 10% chance of winning a one-week tour of England,
67% percent of the participants selected the less probable choice. However, it can
be argued that this is in fact not a violation of the transivity of preference axiom
because the options in the two paradigms are not equivalent. In the first option,
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there is a certain probability and a 0.5 probability of gain. In the second option,
the combined probability of gain is only 0.15, suggesting that subjects or
decision-makers may be assessing the likelihood of gaining anything. If one does
not believe they will come away with a gain, then there is nothing to be lost in
selecting the higher reward condition. This preference switch is also referred to
as the reflection effect, such that if the probabilities do not change, the two
preferences are a reflection of one another. The reflection effect is analogous
with respect to mean reward, the idea of a forager switching from a risk-averse
to a risk-prone choice strategy. Risk-sensitive foraging theory does have a more
subjective component just as this model of expected utility. The choice of the
variable rewards patch or the constant food patch will be selected based on the
organism's energetic requirements. If the animal requires little to satisfy its
energetic necessities, then choose the constant option, but if the animal is at an
energetic deficit, then choose the variable option. This choice between the two
foraging strategies will be a subjective process of energetic interpretation. Utility
and prospect theories are analogous to the biological foraging models. They all
predict the maximization of gain and the minimization of loss in a decision
dictated by uncertainty; nevertheless they cannot be entirely analogous since
individuals foraging for food resources are often in the context of a starvation
situation.
Security-Potential/Aspiration Theory (SP/A). The security-

potential/ aspiration theory (SP/A) asserts that individuals tend to select either a
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low risk with a small outcome or they exploit the potential in a given situation by
attempting to obtain the best results; which are then subject to the interpretation
of the decision-maker. The smallest outcome that a person deems acceptable will
influence one's level of risk taking (Lopes, L.L., 1983; 1984; 1987; Schneider &
Lopes, 1968). Wang (1996) demonstrated that adults are more willing to select a
riskier choice option if the lesser outcome is below their minimum aspiration
level. SP /A recognizes individual differences and variability in choice more
than the preceding utility models. SP /A addresses the idea that those with a
lower aspiration level are likely security-seekers, who are more motivated to
play it safe than to take larger risks. This security-seeking behavior is
comparable to the risk-averse organism in foraging theory, such that the
evaluation of the attained resource or potential is sufficient to warrant a more
conservative risk strategy, in the case of a forager, the lesser variance option.
Bounded Risk Distribution Model. Wang's (2002) Bounded Risk Distribution

Model is the most likely candidate for merging the social cognitive models with
the animal models of risk behavior as it applies to foraging. Wang (2002) asserts
that the risk-taker must consider the highest mean expected value (MEV) of a
choice option as well as the positive and negative variation from the MEV
against task-specific goals and mean requirements. In addition, the mean
requirement should vary depending upon the social and ecological context.
The Bounded Risk Distribution Model is consistent with the relevant
concepts from foraging theories and emphasizes the relationship between mean
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expected value, variation within the expected outcomes (risk distributions), the
mean requirement (MR) of the organism, and the goal setting bounded by the
task within the social and ecological environment. It is the mean expected value
and the mean requirement that dictate the choice strategy employed by the
organism. Therefore, if the mean expected value is above the task-relevant mean
requirement then the forager will demonstrate risk-averse behavior. In contrast,
if the MEV of a choice option is below the MR, then the organism will choose a
variance-seeking strategy.
Although, there are some exceptions to the MEV-MR predictions, the first
occurs when the variance in the expected outcomes fails to provide the mean
requirement or goal, then the organism is expected to be risk-averse in order to
maintain their current resource position (Wang 2002). When a chooser's mean
requirement is above the range of mean plus variance, then they should abandon
all resource options and pursue better alternatives. This prediction is analogous
to the marginal value theorem within optimal foraging theory. Finally, if the
foraging organism's mean requirement or cost of choosing the high variance
option is exceptionally low, then given that the negative consequences of this
choice are minimal, the forager should be variance seeking to maximize their net
return. This model merges principles within optimal foraging theory, risksensitive foraging theory, and individual differences in perception from the
security-potential aspiration theory.
Sex Differences in Choice Behavior
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Another variable to consider in risk-taking behavior is that of sex. Tooby
and Cosmides (1990) make the case that human nature, which they define as
species-typical collections of complex psychological adaptations are the same
across races, ethnic groups, and classes. They assert that this generality within
Homo sapiens is attributable to evolutionary genetics of sexual recombination.
However, Tooby and Cosmides assert that males and females do demonstrate
differences in their behavioral repertoire. In order to support sexual selection, a
complex coordination between the physiological and the psychological systems
of males and females has evolved. Given the differences inherent to males and
females regarding parental investment from an evolutionary perspective, it is not
unreasonable to assume that females will be more risk-averse than males.
Females would have to choose foraging patches based not only on their own
survival, but also on behalf of their young. A female may be more likely to select
the conservative or safe foraging option unless death was eminent and therefore
would be risk-averse under most conditions, except extreme negative budgets.
It could be argued that one would expect to see more dramatic differences in
employed foraging strategies by females if she must maintain her own inclusive
fitness. In theory, it would be more advantageous for females to select the riskprone strategy only in times of extreme dearth. In spite of this, it is unlikely that
a female would select a more variable food patch over a constant resource and
risk the potential loss of her offspring unless choosing not to take the risky
option ensured death.
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Slovic (1966) conducted a study involving a sample of 1,047 children
ranging in age from 6-16. The children volunteered to play a game for the chance
at winning M & M candies. The purpose of this study was to provide evidence
for the validity of the masculinity-boldness stereotype by studying the influence
of age and sex upon decision-making and youngsters' performance on a task
involving risk. The results of this study specifically lend credence to the
prediction that females would be more risk-averse than males. In the literature,
Slovic's study has been colloquially referred to as "the toggle-switch study"
(Kopfstein, 1973) because it utilized a switchboard with ten toggle switches. Out
of the ten switches, one switch acted as a "disaster switch," such that the
selection of this switch would result in the loss of their earned cache of M&Ms. It
was impossible for the participant to tell which switch was the "disaster switch"
so they had to flip the switches based on their mental assessment of the
probability of flipping a non-disaster switch and adding a spoonful of M & Ms to
their cache. Maximization would have been to take the risk of five pulls and
then stop and collect the reward cache because after five pulls, the probability of
switching the disaster toggle would be greater than a safe pull. Slovic's results
indicated that females took less risk with M & M rewards than the boys. In
addition, the caution exhibited by the girls (total average of 2.20 spoons) was an
advantageous strategy; they earned more M & Ms than the boys (total average of
1.84 spoons). The optimal performance strategy used by girls in this study is
analogous to optimal foraging theory. The decision to stop flipping toggle
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switches may demonstrate probability monitoring and an evaluation of the cost
to benefit relationship between continuing to risk and to quit while ahead. The
optimal foraging strategy in this case was to quit half way through the task in
order to maximize one's net gain prior to losing all of the M & M rewards. This
is not counter to the daily energy budget rule because females may still exhibit
risk-proneness under negative energy conditions, but in relation to males it will
be less risk-prone. Although the aim of Slovic's research was to support the
boldness stereotype, the "toggle-switch study" may have simply demonstrated
conservative risk-taking on the part of the females in order to maximize their net
gain.
Kass (1964) addressed decision-making behavior in children as a function
of sex and probability preference as well. The sample consisted of 52 preschool
and elementary school children evenly divided by sex. The task utilized three
identical, simulated slot machines mounted side-by-side. A penny was required
for operation of each machine. The machines were assigned probabilities of 1/1,
with a very low reward; the second machine had a probability of 1/3 , with an
intermediate reward amount and 1/8, with a high reward amount. The
participants had free access to all three machines until they reached 210 trials,
when they were asked to select the machine they liked best and play that one
exclusively. At the onset of the session, the participants were given 14 pennies to
use in play and were told that their earnings were exchangeable for prizes, the
more money they won, the better the prize they could buy at the end. The

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

results indicated a significant sex difference associated with low probability
payoff and intermediate probability payoff. Boys made the greatest number of
responses on the intermediate (1/3) and low probability (1/8) pay-offs and the
least number of responses on the high probability pay-off machines (1/1). The
results for the girls were completely opposite. They demonstrated a higher
number of responses on the high probability pay-off machines (1/1) and the least
on the intermediate (1/3) and low probability machines (1/8). Again, the
differences between boys' choices and girls' choices here may be differences in
sensitivity to maximization. Females may be more disciplined in their risktaking as a consequence of perceived risk-reward values. Logue and Chavarro
(1992) performed a choice experiment in which two options were offered to
children of preschool age. The impulsive option was one sticker with no delay to
reinforcement. Selection of the self-controlled option yielded three stickers with
a 30 second wait. Although neither preschool boys nor the preschool girls
behaved significantly more self-controlled than impulsive, the boys did choose
the impulsive option significantly more than the preschool girls.
Differences in male and female choice preference are predicted for the
current research proposal as well. The purpose of the proposed research is to
investigate the patterns of human foraging behavior in a binary choice option
using a manipulated energy budget. Pietras and Hackenberg (2001) provide the
only published study of risk-sensitive foraging theory using a daily energy
budget model with human subjects. Using a small-n design (n = 3), Pietras and
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Hackenberg (2001) were able to find risk-averse behavior under positive budget
conditions and risk-prone behavior under negative conditions for two of the
three subjects; the third did not demonstrate strong risk-sensitive biases.
Although small-n designs are creditable and typical in comparative research, one
of the goals of this study was to apply a group design to a computerized choice
task. In addition, one of the benefits of utilizing a human subject pool is the
ability of adults to describe their choice behavior and to provide further insight
into the conditions with which they may select one risky option over an
alternate.
Deditius-Island and Szalda-Petree (2002) conducted a between subjects
experiment using male and female college students in a binary, computerized
choice task. The experimental task was set up as a competitive game; the daily
energy budget was manipulated by assigning participants to a winning or losing
condition. The participant first experienced 10 forced choice trials with a
"logging on to the Internet" screen, following the presentation of a "connected"
screen, participants then engaged in the free-choice task. Participants were led to
believe they were competing with another college student online for an
undisclosed sum of money following the completion of the experiment. The free
choice task consisted of a fixed and variable choice option with four status
displays (winning or losing) after every fifteen trials. Although the participant
was never privy to the where they were in relation to the conclusion of the task.
In addition, the status bar was programmed to move along the point barometer,
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such that the bar never moved above the even line in the losing (negative
budget) condition, nor did it move below the even line in the winning (positive
budget) condition. Males in the positive budget group demonstrated a riskaverse bias while all other groups demonstrated risk-ambivalence.

Bivariate

correlations were computed to determine if age, counterbalance or time of day
correlated with the proportion of risk-prone choices. There were no statistically
significant correlations among these variables and the dependent variable. There
were statistically significant differences between males and females in their
choice preference, but the females did not demonstrate a statistically significant
choice preference toward the fixed or variable option for this experimental task.
The males demonstrated risk-averse behavior under a positive budget and less
risk-averse behavior under a negative budget (Deditius-Island & Szalda-Petree,
2002).

Humans are capable of going for long periods of time without eating due
to relatively stable fat reserves. These reserves provide an unparalleled
advantage for large mammals that are not necessarily available to most birds,
fish, or smaller mammals. This may explain why the females in the DeditiusIsland and Szalda-Petree study did not demonstrate risk-sensitive behavior
under either the positive or negative budget condition (2002). There are four
factors that were not addressed in the previous study that may be of value. The
first, parenting status, may be a meaningful variable to consider, the energetic
cost of parenting and the way in which participants change their perceptions of
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valued resources could influence the way in which they respond to variation in
resource rewards. In parallel with parenting status is that of menses for the
females. Gallup (1998) demonstrated that females report greater risk-taking
behavior the further they are from ovulation and the greatest risk-aversion
occurring in conjunction with ovulation. Gallup administered a survey that
asked female participants to respond to questions about their daily behavior and
sexual activity and about their method of contraception. Students taking birth
control pills demonstrated little to no variation in their risk taking behavior as a
function of menses phase, however those who were not on hormonal
contraceptives decreased risky activity during ovulation. Menses was not a
variable considered in the Deditius-Island and Szalda-Petree study (2002).
Another challenge for the current study is that of the negative budget
condition. The losing condition within the competitive treatment did not
necessarily take anything away from the participant when they lost. Unlike true
negative budget conditions, energy is removed from a current bank of reserves.
The money awarded to the winner under the experimental condition was a
surplus of "energy" since the participants did not have the additional money at
the inception of the task. A potential solution to this problem would be to
provide a more analogous negative energy budget state by manipulating
response effort or to disclose to the participants how much time they have
remaining to accrue points. The problem with manipulating response effort
within a human sample is that of variable strength and the problem of
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considerable body fat. Generally people have enough stored energy to prevent
starvation or to prevent extreme hunger as a consequence of energy expenditure.
Therefore manipulating response effort (physically) would create interpretation
problems, since the likelihood of truly creating a negative energy state is
improbable.
Human behavior is not static, nor is it consistent. Behavior can be
influenced by context; this includes previous experience, timing of meal
consumption, and the perception of the risk option. Personality factors may also
contribute to choice preference, for instance if an individual has an "addictive
personality," they may demonstrate less self-control or a higher need for
sensation. Finally, addiction was also not addressed in the study by DeditiusIsland and Szalda-Petree (2002). Substance abuse (specifically smoking and
alcohol use) was addressed in the current study to determine if those individuals
with substance problems demonstrate differential risk-preference in comparison
to those without substance abuse. Rachlin (2000) asserts that individuals with
addictions struggle with the delay to immediate gratification; therefore their selfcontrol is thwarted by the desire for the removal of craving, an aversive stimulus.
The elimination of craving in turn acts as negative reinforcement and thereby
results in long-term behavioral changes with more impulsive patterns of
behavior.
Given that the sample of interest is verbally adroit adults, a measure that
demonstrates positive correlates of risk-sensitive behavior is of relevance.
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Deditius-Island and Szalda-Petree (2002) used Zuckerman's sensation seeking
scales form V and VI (1994) in their choice task; however the study failed to find
sensation-seeking correlates with choice preference. The current study employed
a different personality measure in the pursuit of personality correlates of risk
preference.
NEO Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-PI R. Form S)

Costa and McCrae developed three personality measures based on the
five-factor model (FFM) of personality traits: the NEO Personality Inventory
(NEO-PI) (1985), the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-PI-R) (1995), and
the NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) (1992). The first personality measure
the NEO-PI, measures the domains of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness (to
experience), Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness with six facet scales for the
domains of Neuroticism, Extraversion and Openness. The NEO-PI-R is the same
as the NEO-PI with the inclusion of six facet scores for the other two remaining
domains of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. The NEO-FFI is an abridged
form of the NEO-PI-R; it offers a 60-items for the five domains only. The NEOPI-R also has two forms: Form R, which consists of observer ratings with 240
parallel items to Form S written in the third person for a peer or family member.
The NEO-PI R Form S is a self-administered measure with 240 items that are
appropriate for men and women of all ages (Costa & McCrae, 1992). This
measure was selected for the second experiment based on the flexibility of the
facet scales and the generality of the scale and the variety of research applications
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to which it can be used. This is typically not a scale used to measure
psychopathology; it is used to measure self-concept and to provide actuality
estimates of what an individual is truly like (Costa & McCrae, 1995). The NEOPI R Form S may provide a valid and reliable means for the investigation of
correlates between personality factors and choice behavior and how those
personality dimensions may influence risk preferences in a foraging task. This
measure was selected based on the broad applicability and flexibility of the scale
and based on a reliability generalization conducted by Caruso (2000). Caruso
(2000) showed consistent score reliability across all domains of the NEO-PI R,
with the lowest reliability score at 0.75 and the highest for neuroticism at 0.83.
There were five hypotheses for this study, the first asserted that under the
winning condition, (positive budget) males would demonstrate risk-aversion and
under the losing condition (negative budget) risk-prone behavior. However,
females would demonstrate risk-averse behavior under both the positive
(winning) and the negative budget (losing) conditions with less risk-aversion in
the negative budget condition. If the evolutionary explanation (i.e. parental
investment theory) as posited by Trivers (1985) also applies to conditions of
choice, females should behave conservatively. Natural selection likely favors
those females who demonstrate conservation, as necessitated by maternal
responsibility and high parental investment. Applied to risk, women should be
risk-averse under modest cost conditions as well as under high stake conditions
because she must account for another life.
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The remaining four hypotheses were all exploratory. The second
hypothesis predicted that participants with children would demonstrate greater
risk-sensitivity/ than those without children. This is essentially analogous to
increasing the stakes; thereby changes in an energy budget should facilitate
greater vacillations in foraging strategies among those individuals who are
parents, in comparison to the pre-bred individuals. The third hypothesis
asserted that females unconstrained by hormonal contraceptives would display
the greatest risk aversion, especially those ovulating during the time of the task.
The fourth hypothesis was based on studies of self-control and delay-togratification, we expected that participants with greater self-reported use of
nicotine, caffeine, or alcohol would also demonstrate greater risk-sensitivity than
non-users.
CAGE. The CAGE, the most widely studied self-report instrument for

alcohol problems was used to assess substance use among the participants
(Aertgeertz, Buntinx, Bande-Knops, Vandermeulen, Roelants, Ansoms, & Fevery,
2000). The CAGE is a four-item measure that takes roughly one minute to
complete. CAGE is an acronym for the following questions: 1) Have you ever felt
you ought to Cut down on your drinking? 2) Have people Annoyed you by
criticizing your drinking? 3) Have you ever felt bad or G uilty for your drinking?
4) Have you ever had a drink first think in the morning as an Eye-opener? (Shields
& Caruso, In Press). The CAGE was used as an alcohol use screen and a
modified CAGE was used for tobacco and caffeine use as well. Finally, the fifth
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hypothesis addressed behavioral correlates of risk-sensitive foraging behavior
within the domains of the NEO-PI-R. It was predicted that individuals who
demonstrate higher risk-prone responding would also score high on the domain
of extraversion and openness.
Method
Participants

Male (n = 90) and female (n = 145), psychology students from the
Introductory Psychology Course subject pool were recruited for this task. Males
mean age was 20, while the average age of female participants was 21 years.
Apparatus

Two PC computers programmed using a Visual Basic 6.0 program and
operating under the Windows 95 system with a serial mouse. Both computers
were equipped with SV and the monitors were set at a resolution of 640 x 480
pixels.
Procedure

Participants were met at an experimental room (measuring 2.55 x 3.57 m),
where two computers were situated side-by-side and separated by a partition 1.8
m in height. The experimental room accommodated two participants per onehour experimental session. Participants read and signed a University of
Montana informed consent sheet. Participant numbers, age, sex, number of
children, tobacco use, alcohol and caffeine consumption were entered into a
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subject record form presented on the computer screen prior to the start of the
computer task.
The experimental task was divided into two phases, 10 forced-choice trials
and five blocks of 15 free-choice trials, totaling 75 free-choice trials in all. In both
types of trials, a choice was recorded following three mouse-clicks on the
stimulus box. Given the ease of selection, three clicks designated a commitment
to the choice and also allowed the participant an opportunity to change their
choice selection. When the participants read the instructions to the forced choice
trials (see Appendix), they clicked on an icon at the bottom of their participant
record form labeled "start," thereby initiating the forced-choice trials. The
forced choice trials consisted of single choice option presentation per trial, once a
choice was made, the point value for that choice was displayed for 3-seconds and
the next trial commenced. Once all ten trials were completed, a second
instruction screen was presented (see Appendix). The second set of instructions
informed the participants of the game objective: earn as many points as possible
in order to beat your Internet competitor.
The experimental procedure utilized deception that created a competitive
component for the task. In natural foraging environments, we are generally
competing with conspecifics for desirable resources, therefore, it was anticipated
that creating a competitive task would increase the saliency of the computer task.
Students learned of the "competitor" in the free-choice instructions, which
indicated that the participants would be competing for points with Introductory
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Psychology students from another University. Clicking on a start box at the
bottom of the instructions initiated an Internet connecting screen with a 10second count down to "log-on" with a linking designation. The connecting
screen w as modeled after Internet computer games where participants must link
with others on the Internet to compete for high point designations. To increase
the experimental realism of the competitor, the researchers told the participants
during the logging on screen, "it may take a moment for your competitor to log
on, as the other participants may have arrived to their designated appointment a
couple minutes after you. If you have trouble logging on to the Internet please
let me know." Once the connecting screen indicated that both participants were
logged on, the participants were shown a status screen with a continuum bar
indicating "EVEN" along a status barometer (see Figure 2) the free-choice trials
were then presented.
The free choice trials were conducted in the same manner as the forcedchoice trials except they provided simultaneous presentation of both choice
options and the individual's participant number was visible along with the
University of Montana's abbreviated letters, "UM" at the lower left hand comer
of the screen. The competing participant's number (same as the UM subject) and
a University designation of "WSU" were also visible in the lower right hand
corner of the screen. A trial number indicator was also visible during the freechoice trials. The trial indicator represented the number of trials remaining while
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the participant made choice selections. Therefore the participant was always
privy to how many trials were remaining in the task.
Participant selection of the variable option yielded 1 or 5 points, (p (1
point) = .5 and p (5 points) = .5) whereas selection of the fixed option exclusively
yielded 3 points (p (3 points) = 1.0). Feedback on relative performance to the
supposed competitor was provided after blocks of 15 trials with the presentation
of the status screen. Consequently there were four presentations of the status
screen to coincide with each trial block of 15 trials. The location of the status bar
along the winning or losing barometer presented "behind" or "ahead,"
depending on the participant's budget condition. To ensure believability of the
manipulation localized movement of the status bar within the losing or winning
gradient of the status barometer contributed to the perception of progress or
decrement as a consequence of choice strategy. However, this status bar
movement was programmed by the budget group designation and was not
contingent on the participants' choice during the trials.
Participants were randomly assigned, in roughly equal numbers, to the
two budget conditions. The side (left or right) presentation of the choice boxes
were pseudo-randomized and counterbalanced by trial, whereas the choice box
color (blue or yellow) was counterbalanced by participant for each randomly
assigned option. Following the choice task, a computerized post-experimental
questionnaire was presented and participants were asked to recall which choices
they made more (blue vs. yellow) within each trial block. They were asked to
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rank their level of motivation on a scale of 1 to 3 (1 = not motivated, 3 = highly
motivated) to beat their Internet competitor, how engaging they found the task
on a scale of 1 to 3 (1 = bored, 3 = very engaged), if they found the instructions
clear (yes or no), also if they chose one box overall more than another. For
females, a contraceptive screen was presented asking the participants if they
were currently using hormonal contraceptives and if they were not, to recall the
first day of their last menses. Once these questions were completed, a thank you
screen was presented and the participants were asked to complete the NEO-PI R
form S using a test booklet and Scantron. Participants were told that winners in
the choice task were entered into a weekly lottery for $100. Following data
collection, the participants were verbally debriefed, or they were given a
debriefing handout regarding the task.
Results
All statistical analyses of choice data were conducted using the proportion
of risk-prone choices. The risk-prone proportion was calculated by dividing the
number of variable option choices by the total number of trials excluding the first
block of 15 trials (trials = 60). The first block of trials was excluded because the
participants during that phase of the task were told they were even with their
competitor. Menstrual cycle phase was determined using the forward cycle
method (Grammar, 1993). The forward cycle method entails beginning at the
participant's self-reported first day of menses and then to count forward to the
test date. Although more invasive methods of determining ovulation can have
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somewhat better accuracy (e.g. Graham, Janssen, & Sanders, 2000; Petralia &
Gallup, 2002), the forward cycle method has been used to roughly determine
menses phase in a number of behavioral studies (e.g. Chavanne & Gallup, 1997;
Grammar, 1993; Petralia & Gallup, 2002) and is sufficient for a preliminary
investigation of menses phase and risk prone choices. Only women who fell
within 13-16 days post-menses and were not using hormonal contraceptives
were considered to be within their ovulatory phase, this is a conservative
window given the variability of ovulation within a menses cycle.
Table 1 shows one-sample t-test results for the risk-prone proportion for
each budget/ sex combination. Males demonstrated risk-sensitive behavior in
both budget groups. Under the positive budget males demonstrated a risk-averse
preference and under the negative budget a risk-prone preference. Females had a
risk-averse orientation across both budgets but only the negative budget
demonstrated a significant risk-averse preference. Additionally, a 2 (budget) x 2
(sex) ANOVA was conducted using the proportion of risk-prone choices.
Results from the ANOVA revealed a main effect for Budget (F(l, 235) = 5.50,
p < .05), no main effect for Sex (F(l, 235) = .608, p < .05), and a significant Budget

x Sex interaction (F(l, 235) =11.23, p < .01) (see Figure 1). A post-hoc analysis of
the interaction, using Tukey's F1SD (a =.05), revealed that the male/negative
budget group was significantly more risk-prone than the m ale/ positive budget
group and fem ale/ negative budget group. All other pair-wise comparisons were
not significantly different. Based on the above data, there is support for the first
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hypothesis. As predicted, males were risk-averse in the positive budget and riskprone in the negative budget and females were risk-averse in both budgets,
albeit only significantly so in the negative budget.
Bivariate correlations were conducted to determine if age (r = -.237,
p< .01), children (r = -.077, p< .05), substance use, or ovulation (r = .004, p< .05)
correlated with the proportion of risk-prone choices. The only statistically
significant correlation was between age and risk preference, according to the
data, the older the subject the greater their risk-averse behavior.
For the CAGE responses, two groups were formed. Group one,
represented clinically significant use of alcohol and by extension tobacco and
caffeine. Group two included the nonclinical respondents. Clinical designations
were determined by total scores of 2 or higher, while values less than 2 were
categorized as non-clinical users. Clinical and nonclinical-use of the three
substances were analyzed in an independent samples t-test with risk-prone
choices as the test variable (see Table 11). Despite the evidence for the first
hypothesis, these analyses fail to confirm the second, third, or fourth hypotheses.
The fifth hypothesis for the study predicted that one or more of the
domain scales from the NEO-PI R form S would correlate with risk-preference.
There were no significant correlations for any of the domain or facet scores for
females and their proportion of risk-prone choices (see Table 3). Among the
males, there were no significant correlations between the NEO-PI R domain
scores and risk preference, but there were two significant facet scale correlations
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with the overall proportion of risk-prone choices. Activity (r = -.229, p < .05)/and
tender-mindedness (r = -.217, p < .05) were both negatively correlated with risk
prone choice. Low scorers on tender-mindedness are less moved by others'
needs and by appeals to pity. They are considered more hardheaded and
consider themselves realists and rational decision makers (Costa & McCrae,
1992). Low scores on activity are considered leisurely and relaxed with regard to
energy expenditure. Both of these facets scores do in fact adhere to the
theoretical conception of risk-sensitive foraging theory given these correlations
are negative, indicating that risk-prone responses are elevated; however, other
facet scores that are not correlated with risk-prone behavior like excitement
seeking would be anticipated. This makes the interpretation of the two facet
correlations more difficult, given this, and the fact that the fifth hypothesis was
restricted to the domains scores.
Score reliability can be eliminated as a potential cause for the poor
predictive ability of the NEO-PI R for the choice behavior among our sample.
The unweighted mean (M = .85) values for the domain scores indicate that the
NEO-PI R demonstrates good score reliability among this sample of college
students. However, the combined score reliabilities are fair to poor for the facet
scores. The reliability coefficients ranged from .46 to .80 (range - .34) indicating
substantial variability in the reliability of facet scores for the NEO-PI R (see Table
3). It is relevant to note that the NEO-PI R did correlate with other variables
other than risk preference, these include: ovulation and neuroticism 1, the facet
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score for anxiety (r = .296, p < .05), ovulation and openness to experience 1, the
facet score for fantasy (r = -.302, p < .05).
Correlations between alcohol and facet and domain scores were also
found, these include: neuroticism 1, the facet score for anxiety (r = .147, p < .05),
neuroticism 2 (r = .183, p < .01), the facet score for angry hostility, neuroticism 4
(r = .148, p < .05), the facet score for self consciousness, neuroticism 5 (r = .257,
p < .01), the facet score for impulsiveness, and the domain score of neuroticism
(r = .242, p < .01). Tobacco use correlated with neuroticism 5 (r = .129, p < .05),
the facet score for impulsiveness, agreeableness 2 (r = -.146, p < .05), the facet
score for straightforwardness, conscientiousness 1 (r = -.179, p < .01), the facet
score for competence; conscientiousness 3 (r = -.200, p < .01), the facet score for
dutifulness; conscientiousness 4 (r = -.182, p < .01), the facet score for
achievement striving; conscientiousness 6 (r = -.187, p < .01), the facet score for
deliberation, and the domain score of conscientiousness (r = -.219, p < .01). For
frequencies of the domain and facet scores please refer to Tables 4-10.
There were also significant correlations within the facet and domain
scores of the NEO-PI R. These results indicate that although the measures failed
to predict choice patterns, there were in fact successful in predicting substance
use for various personality constructs, particularly those within neuroticism
(r = .242, p < .01). Based on previous studies utilizing the NEO-PI R for
predicting substance use, substance abusers appear more neurotic than those in
the norm group (McCormick, Dowd, Quirk, & Hernando Zegarra, 1998).
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Discussion
As predicted by hypothesis one, males and females demonstrated risksensitivity in their choice patterns. The males demonstrated a significant riskprone bias under the negative budget and a significant risk-averse bias under the
positive budget. Further, as predicted, the females were risk-averse under both
conditions, although only significantly risk-averse under the negative budget,
this is reversed from the expected directionality. Therefore hypothesis one is
fully supported for the males, but only partially supported for the females. This
is consistent with Pietras and Hackenberg's (2002) results, such that the one male
and one female demonstrated risk-sensitivity and while the other female risk
indifferent. Unlike Pietras and Hackenberg's results, this investigation of risk
preference utilized a group design and although individual females in our
sample did demonstrate risk-sensitive behavior within the two budgets, this
sensitivity was not descriptive of the females as a whole.
One potential explanation for the female risk-sensitive behavior,
specifically, more risk-averse in the negative budget, is that the competition and
reward variables may not have been particularly salient for females. The
Bounded Risk Distribution Model asserts that when variance in the expected
outcomes fails to reach the mean requirement, then greater risk aversion will
result. In addition, if the mean requirement is beyond the range of the mean plus
variance relative to the mean requirement, then they should seek better
alternatives. In either budget condition, the mean requirement is to win.
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In the losing condition (negative budget), the mean requirement (winning) is
beyond the range of the mean plus variance, which predicts that the chooser will
seek out better alternatives. In our task, the participant is unable to seek out
alternatives, so the best strategy may be to maintain the status quo, which
predicts risk-aversion. According to BRD, males did not employ the risk-averse
strategy in the negative budget because the perceived cost of losing was likely
more adverse. The competitive component of the task for the males may have
had greater saliency and therefore greater investment in optimizing one's point
cache. Assuming that parental investment theory (Trivers, 1985) as it relates to
mating behavior, also applies to conditions of choice, females should behave
conservatively. Natural selection likely favors those females who demonstrate
conservation, as necessitated by maternal responsibility and high parental
investment. Applied to risk, women should be risk-averse under modest cost
conditions as well as under high stake conditions. Since our task may not have
provided salient environmental cues for the females, risk-indifference occurred
under the positive budget.
Another possible explanation for the females' reverse directionality is that
the negative budget may be the only condition truly tapping into the risksensitive behavior. The positive budget does not result in a cost and the
competitive component, although they are not significantly different, does not
appear to be as salient for females as it was for males (see Table 10). If this is
true and the lacks saliency for females, there are no disadvantages to choosing
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the variable option. In fact, even within the economic literature risk-indifference
occurs under limited loss conditions and has been a problem for plausible
explanation by the expected utility theory. Expected utility theory (EUT)
predicts that risk-neutrality should occur under potentially economically
important stakes (Rabin, 1999). Rabin (1999) has argued, "energy-maximizers are
arbitrarily close to risk neutral when stakes are arbitrarily small." Risk-sensitive
foraging theory accounts for this problem by invoking natural selection as the
mechanism for variable choice preference under conditions of dearth, that
"energy" as it is applied within the foraging literature represents caloric dearth.
By extension, the application of caloric dearth to human primates is an unlikely
problem, humans typically operate within a positive caloric energy budget. In
addition, the concept of "credit" may inoculate one's sensitivity to money as a
reasonable analogue to caloric energy. This is not true of time, there are few
ways to earn "credit" for time and therefore the application of money is best
replaced with unit of "energy." In an effort to adhere to the methodological
precedent set by Pietras and Hackenberg's (2002) study in employing human
subjects in a risk-sensitivity task, we maintained the points-for-money reward.
Future studies of risk-sensitivity among human subjects would be wise to revise
the current methodology by manipulating delay times instead of points.
The second hypothesis asserted that parents would be more risk-sensitive
than pre-bred participants. Due to the limited number of parents within the
subject pool, the relationship between parenting status and choice preference
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should be considered purely exploratory. There were only twenty-three parents
within our sample of Psychology 100 students. For males, the negative budget
condition did not have any parents and in the positive budget, there were only
four, so the two groups could not be compared. Among the females, there were
a total of nineteen parents between the two budget groups. The analysis of
choice patterns by the twelve female parents within the positive budget revealed
nonsignificant t-values. Therefore, it is difficult to say anything about the
second hypothesis other than it was not supported potentially due to the limited
number of subjects for comparison.
The remaining three exploratory hypotheses were also unsupported.
Specifically, none of the domain scores for the NEO PI were significantly
correlated with risk preference, nor was the modified CAGE for tobacco and
caffeine use, or the CAGE for alcohol. For the sample of females within this
study who did not use hormonal contraceptives, their choice patterns did not
demonstrate significant correlations with risk preference. For ovulation and
NEO-PI R correlations, there were two positively correlated facet scores (anxiety
and fantasy) within the domain of neuroticism and openness to experience with
ovulation. However, given that other domain and facet scale scores that one
would expect to be predictive of ovulation (e.g. excitement seeking, tendermindedness, extraversion, etc) did not correlate with ovulation it difficult to
interpret these findings. In spite of the lack of correlational relationships
between ovulation and the other facet scores, the relationship between fantasy
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and anxiety are directionally consistent with previous studies of risk and
ovulation (e.g. Chavanne & Gallup, 1997; Grammar, 1993; Petralia & Gallup,
2002). There are two potential reasons for limited results concerning the
ovulation and NEO-PI R results, the first is limited sample. The second
explanation may be that ovulatory phase within this sample of females is too
variable to be measured using the forward method and consequently a more
sensitive measure is necessary.
There are three potential explanations regarding the inability of the two
personality measures (e.g. Sensation Seeking Scales from the first study and the
NEO-PI R of the current study) to predict risk-sensitive behavior, the first is the
evolutionary premise of risk-sensitivity. If risk-sensitive behavior is truly an
evolved behavior as a consequence of natural selection, then it would stand to
reason that the behavior should be unrelated to individual differences, it would
be exclusively manipulated and thereby predicted as a consequence of the
environmental constraints alone. A second explanation is that of semantics.
Personality measures claiming to predict risk taking and sensation seeking
personalities are defining risk much differently. "Risk" in this context is defined
as a sensitivity to peril or danger, one who is or is not risky or sensation seeking
falls towards the ends of the risky or sensation seeking gradient, indicating they
are less sensitive to danger or that they need greater environmental stimulation
to be aroused. "Risk" in the context of foraging or risk-sensitive behavior, has
little to do with sensitivity to danger; it is one's sensitivity to the unpredictable
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variability in an outcome (Zuckerman, 1994). The theory of risk-sensitivity
asserts that the switching between choosing a constant option verses selecting
variable options is fundamentally a part of survival constructs and that is the
environment not the personality that draws on this behavioral strategy. Thereby
the inclusion of a personality instrument used to measure conventional "risk" is
not calibrated to "risk" in the context of risk-sensitivity because they are two
different things, linked only by semantics. This may also elucidate why the
addiction measures were poor sources for predictive choice patterns, as well as
why the females within the ovulation group did not demonstrate a greater
degree of risk-sensitive behavior. "Risk" and "risk-sensitivity" are not analogous
and therefore it may be disadvantageous to assume that those measures
predictive of one would be predictive of the other.
A third explanation for why thus far there are no correlates of risksensitivity and personality is that the correct measure has not yet been identified.
However, this is the most improbable explanation given that the NEO-PI R has
been widely used and demonstrated fairly consistent and reliable predictive
validity for a dramatic array of behaviors (Costa & McCrae, 1992). In addition,
regarding the addiction measures, admittedly the CAGE has been shown to be a
poor measure for identifying addiction in college students (e.g. Aertgeerts,
Buntinx, Bande-Knops, Vandermeulen, Roelantes, Ansoms, & Fevery, 2000; Heck
& Williams, 1994), the goal in using this measures was to find a general and brief
instrument to correlate use and non-use with risk-sensitive behavior. The CAGE
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was also successful in predicting alcohol use with neurotic personalities, which is
consistent with the literature (McCormick, Dowd, Quirk, & Hernando Zegarra,
1998). A problem with this general approach to identifying use rather than
addiction is that among college students it can be problematic in accurately
identifying stable use from situational use brought on by initial college
experience. In addition, our sample as a group did not report problem use
( M aic o h o i=:1 . 1 2 ,

Mcaffeine=1.03, M t o b a c c o = l - 1 3 ) for any one of the addictive substances.

So the failure in predicting risk-sensitivity by substance use may be attributable
to our measure selection, lack of problem use, or again addiction may not be a
predictor of risk-sensitive behavior.
Although the current investigation of risk-sensitivity did extract risksensitive behavior from both males and females (although only in the negative
budget) it is still meaningful to refine our current methods. One way to do this
may be to manipulate delay rather than points. Manipulating delay may provide
a perceived opportunity to get out of the study early, assuming the participants
are only engaging in the study to fulfill a credit requirement, not because the
research in and of itself is so rewarding. This is a reasonable alteration to the
methods given that such theories like scalar expectancy theory (SET) predict that
differences exist depending upon what unit of energy is manipulated. When
variability occurs in food amount (applied to humans, money or points for
money), risk-aversion is expected, when variability is in delay, risk-prone
behavior is expected. Utilizing a more salient unit of energy should distill risk-
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sensitivity for females and in the direction consistent with the first hypothesis.
Investigating parental influence, substance use (alcohol and tobacco), and
ovulation may be more meaningful with a procedure that is better able to pull
female risk-sensitive behavior within both positive and negative budgets. To this
end, replacing variable and constant points-for money with variable and
constant delays between trials could be manipulated. An inter-trial interval
would be presented following the selection of each choice and a timer counting
down seconds to the next trial would make the delay relevant A constant
number of points would be earned for each choice option (as opposed to constant
verses variable), but the perception of earning more points would be revealed in
speed to complete the task rather than discriminating between points earned.
The modification to the current procedure would be minimal but could have a
considerable impact on the perceptual relevance of the task for participants.
Despite the lack of support for the fifth hypothesis, it is still meaningful to
pursue a predictive measure of risk-preference. Even if other personality
measures are not predictive of risk-sensitive behavior this failure would provide
further support for the ecological and evolutionary models of risk sensitivity,
which is that it is not attributable to personality constructs.
It is relevant to investigate risk-sensitivity in humans, as much of our
behavior is dictated by the estimation of the cost-benefits of a given choice.
Further insight into the mechanism and proclivity males and females may have
for differing risk situations could facilitate greater understanding and additional
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research within the context of gambling, economics, addiction, and cognition.
Further examination of choice behavior must be addressed before conclusive
statements can be made concerning risk-sensitivity and the applicability of the
daily energy budget model to human behavior. The inclusion of a personality
measure that may provide some predictive domains of risk-preference may lend
further insight into the areas of addiction, impulsivity, and may confirm those
conditions individuals with impulse control problems and addictions will be
most vulnerable. If problems concerning addiction and self-control are the
consequence of predisposed, biological constructs, better treatment plans may be
developed to care for and deter further problem behaviors.
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Table 1
Risk Prone Choice Proportions for Males and Females

Sex and Budget Condition

n

Positive Budget

44

Proportion of
Risk-Prone
Choices
.42

Negative Budget

46

Positive Budget
Negative Budget

SEM

One-sample
t-value

.039

-2.42*

.55

.018

2.97**

79

.48

.023

.023

66

.46

.019

-2.088*

Males

Females
Note. *p<.05. **p<.01.
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Table 2
Cronbach Alpha Reliabilities for Combined NEO-PI R Form S

Cronbach's a
.87

Mean
92.74

Std. Dev.
18.10

Extraversion

.83

116.80

17.10

Openness to Experience

.81

118.71

19.38

Agreeableness

.86

115.38

17.44

Conscientiousness

.88

111.18

18.84

CAGEAicohoi

.57

1.12

1.17

CAGETobacco

.78

1.13

1.40

CAGEcaffeine

.61

1.03

1.13

Domain Scores
Neuroticism

Note. Combined N = 235.
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Table 3
Correlations: NEO-PI R and Proportion of Risk-Prone (RP) Choices

Domain Scores
Neuroticism

Extraversion

Openness to Experience

Agreeableness

Conscientiousness

Sex
Males

Proportion RP Choices
Pearson's r
-.030

Females

.062

Combined

.016

Males

-.065

Females

-.034

Combined

-.049

Males

-.116

Females

-.087

Combined

-.100

Males

-.069

Females

.103

Combined

.238

Males

-.172

Females

-.072

Combined

-.109

Note. Nmales ~ 90, Nfemales ~~ 145, Ncombined —235. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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Table 4
Frequencies for the NEO-PI R Form S Domain Scores
Domains Scores
Neuroticism

Extraversion

Openness

Agreeableness

Conscientiousness

Note. Nmales

Sex
Males

Means

Std.

88.79

18.02

1.90

Females

95.19

17.80

1.48

Combined

92.74

18.10

1.18

Males

115.93

17.81

1.88

Females

117.34

16.68

1.38

Combined

116.80

17.10

1.12

Males
Females

118.39

21.21

2.23

118.91

18.22

1.51

Combined

118.71

19.38

1.26

Males

109.92

14.97

1.58

Females

118.77

18.05

1.50

Combined

115.38

17.44

1.14

Males

111.28

17.72

1.87

Females

111.12

19.57

1.63

Combined

111.18

18.84

1.23

SEM

90, Nfemales ~~ 145, Ncombined—235.
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Table 5
Frequencies for the NEO-PI R Form S Neuroticism Facet Scores
Facet Score
N l: Anxiety

N2: Angry Hostility

N3: Depression

N4: Self-Consciousness

N5: Impulsiveness

N6: Vulnerability

Note. Nmales —90, Nfemales

Sex
Males

Means
15.53

Std.
4.50

SEM
.475

Females

17.90

4.37

.363

Combined

16.99

4.56

.297

Males

14.46

4.67

.492

Females

14.607

4.53

.376

Combined

14.55

4.58

.299

Males
Females

14.53
15.60

4.56
5.68

.481
.472

Combined

15.19

5.30

.346

Males

14.70

4.10

.432

Females

16.01

4.35

.361

Combined

15.51

4.30

.280

Males

18.37

4.40

.464

Females

18.66

3.98

.330

Combined

18.54

4.14

.270

Males

11.16

3.48

.367

Females

12.49

3.80

.316

Combined

11.98

3.73

.243

145, Ncombined ~ 235.
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Table 6
Frequencies for the NEO-PI R Form S Extraversion Facet Scores
Facet Score
El: Warmth

E2: Gregariousness

E3: Assertiveness

E4: Activity

E5: Excitement-Seeking

E6: Positive Emotions

Sex
Males

Means
21.96

Std.
4.116

SEM
.434

Females

23.01

3.85

.32

Combined

22.61

3.98

.260

Males

17.10

5.05

.533

Females

17.99

4.76

.395

Combined

17.65

4.88

.319

Males
Females

16.99
16.10

4.58
4.95

.483
.411

Combined

16.44

4.82

.315

Males

18.00

3.64

.383

Females

18.00

3.55

.295

Combined

18.00

3.58

.233

Males

21.62

3.86

.406

Females

20.31

4.81

.400

Combined

20.81

4.51

.294

Males

20.27

4.58

.482

Females

21.92

4.60

.382

Combined

21.29

4.65

.303

Note. Nmales ~ 90, Nfemales ~ 145, Ncombined ~ 235.
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Table 7
Frequencies for the NEO-PI R Form S Openness Facet Scores
Facet Score
Ol: Fantasy

02: Aesthetics

03: Feelings

04: Actions

05: Ideas

06: Values

Note. Nmales

Sex
Males

Means
20.78

Std.
4.70

SEM
.496

Females

20.26

4.76

.395

Combined

20.46

4.74

4.74

Males

17.61

5.99

.632

Females

19.60

5.64

.468

Combined

18.84

5.84

.381

Males
Females

21.80
22.54

4.63
3.75

.488
.311

Combined

22.26

4.11

.268

Males

16.56

3.84

.405

Females

16.17

3.76

.312

Combined

16.31

4.79

3.79

Males

20.74

5.20

.548

Females

18.63

5.40

.449

Combined

19.44

5.41

.353

Males

20.90

4.82

.508

Females

21.72

4.06

.337

Combined

21.41

4.37

.285

90, Nfemales ~ 145, Ncombined ~ 235.
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Table 8
Frequencies for the NEO-PI R Form S Agreeableness Facet Scores
Facet Score
Al: Trust

A2: Straightforwardness

A3: Altruism

A4: Compliance

A5: Modesty

A6: Tender-Mindedness

Sex
Males

Means
18.61

Std.
4.42

SEM
.466

Females

19.56

4.92

.409

Combined

19.20

4.75

.310

Males

17.18

3.99

.421

Females

19.48

4.74

.394

Combined

18.60

4.60

.300

Males
Females

22.60
23.66

3.46
3.87

.365
.322

Combined

23.25

3.75

.245

Males

15.48

3.85

.406

Females

16.63

4.63

.384

Combined

16.19

4.37

.285

Males

17.12

4.49

.474

Females

19.44

4.198

.349

Combined

18.55

4.45

.290

Males

18.93

4.091

.431

Females

20.01

3.75

.312

Combined

19.60

3.91

.255

Note. Nmales ~ 90, Nfemales ~ 145, Ncombined —235.
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Table 9
Frequencies for the NEO-PI R Form S Conscientiousness Facet Scores
Facet Score
Cl: Competence

C2: Order

C3: Dutifulness

C4: Achievement Setting

C5: Self-Discipline

C6: Deliberation

Sex
Males

Means
20.71

Std.
3.38

SEM
.360

Females

19.86

4.06

.337

Combined

20.19

3.83

.250

Males

17.71

4.52

.480

Females

17.66

5.30

.440

Combined

17.68

5.00

.326

Males
Females

20.54
20.50

4.25
3.87

.448
.322

Combined

20.51

4.01

.262

Males

18.51

3.92

.413

Females

18.76

4.40

.365

Combined

18.66

4.21

.275

Males

18.26

4.15

.437

Females

18.32

4.84

.402

Combined

18.29

4.58

.299

Males

15.54

4.19

.441

Females

16.03

4.27

.355

Combined

15.84

4.24

.276

Note. Nmales ~ 90, Nfemales ~ 145, Ncombined —235.
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Table 10
Frequencies for the Post-Experimental Questionnaire
Interest in the Task
(Engaging)

Mean

SEM

2.11

.114

2.28

.102

2.15

.077

2.23

.087

Mean

SEM

2.02

.110

1.93

.118

1.92

.078

2.23

.078

Mean

SEM

1.70

.106

2.04

.108

1.81

.079

2.14

.090

Males

Females
Motivation
(Money)
Males

Females
Motivation
(Competitor)
Males

Females
N ote. Nmales —90, Nfemales ~ 145, Ncombined - 235.
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Table 11
Independent Samples t-test for response to the CAGE and risk-prone choices
N

Proportion
RP Choices

SEM

One sample
t-value

Clinical

34

.51

.024

-.886

Nonclinical

56

.48

.027

-.886

Clinical

35

.52

.027

-1.193

Nonclinical

55

55

.47

.027

Clinical

23

.53

.024

-1.32

Nonclinical

67

.48

.024

-1.32

Clinical

48

.47

.024

.211

Nonclinical

97

.47

.018

.211

Clinical

42

.46

.032

.736

Nonclinical

103

.48

.015

.736

Clinical

49

.49

.027

-.832

Nonclinical

96

.46

.017

-.832

Group
Males
Alcohol

Tobacco

Caffeine
Females
Alcohol

Tobacco

Caffeine
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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Figure 1

Proportion of Risk-Prone (RP) Choices by Males and Females
Under a Positive and Negative Energy Budget
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Figure 2
Status Screen
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Instructions for the Forced-Choice Trials

INSTRUCTIONS
Once you start the program, you will be presented with set of practice trials.
During these trials, a yellow OR a blue choice box will be visible. These two
choice options yield differing point values. All you have to do is move the
cursor with your joystick to the choice box until a point value is shown. The
practice trials will only present you with one choice box (yellow or blue) at a
time and none of the points will be incrementing. These trials are in place in an
effort to familiarize you with the different point values of each choice selection.
After 10 trials, you will be presented with another instruction screen.
The second instruction screen will signal the start of the free-choice trials, your
points will increment for each choice and you will be competing with another
student.
If you have questions, please ask the researcher now to clarify, if not please move
the cursor to the "start program" icon to begin.
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Instructions for the Free-Choice Trials

INSTRUCTIONS
Now that you have been exposed to the two choice options, you will be asked to
connect to the Internet to compete with a student from a participating college. In
this part of the study, you will again select one of the two choice boxes in each
trial. Again the two boxes will represent either a variable point amount of 1 or 5,
or a constant amount of 3, just like in the forced choice trials. The goal of the
game is to increment as many points as you can. You will be able to determine
where you are (winning, losing, or even) relative to your competitor via a status
barometer along the right side of the experimental screen. Whoever wins the
game will receive a MONETARY PRIZE provided by a grant funded by the
National Psychological Community (NPC).
All of the sign-up times, including yours were paired with sign-up times from
the participating University. Given the variability with which students arrive to
their appointment, there may be a brief delay while your competitor completes
the forced choice trials, reads the instructions, and logs on the Internet. Please be
patient. Your game id number will be your participant number and the
abbreviation "UM" for the University of Montana. Your competitor will have the
same participant number, but with a different college abbreviation. When you
have read and understand these instructions, log on by moving the cursor to the
"connect" button at the bottom of the screen.
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Appreciation Screen

Thank you for your participation!
You will receive two experimental credits for your involvement in this
study. Before you leave, please complete our questionnaires, and wait for the
post-experimental debriefing. YOU ARE EXPECTED TO MAINTAIN THE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF THIS TASK! Please do not discuss any aspect of this
experiment with your peers. Thank you & enjoy your day!
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Free-Choice Screen
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